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Abstract: Long–term public sector sponsored training programs often show lit-
tle or negative short–run employment effects and often it is not possible to assess
whether positive long–run effects exist. Based on unique administrative data, this
paper estimates the long–run differential employment effects of three different types
of training programs in West Germany. We use inflows into unemployment for the
years 1986/87 and 1993/94 and apply local linear matching based on the estimated
propensity score to estimate the effects of training programs starting during 1 to 2,
3 to 4, and 5 to 8 quarters of unemployment. The results show a negative lock–
in effect for the period right after the beginning of the program and significantly
positive treatment effects on employment rates in the medium– and long–run. The
differential effects of the three programs compared to one another are mainly driven
by differences in the length of the lock–in periods.
Keywords: multiple treatments, training programs, employment effects, local lin-
ear matching, administrative data, active labor market programs
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1 Introduction
Public sector sponsored training has traditionally been a main part of active labor
market policy (ALMP) in many countries and countries like Germany have devoted
a lot of resources to training programs. During the last decade, there were many
pessimistic assessments regarding the usefulness of public sector sponsored training
programs in raising employment chances of the unemployed (see the surveys in Fay,
1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002).
While the surveys emphasized that small scale training programs, which are well
targeted to specific groups and which involve a strong on–the–job component, can
show positive employment effects, these studies doubt that the large scale training
programs in countries like Germany are successful in raising on average the employ-
ment chances of adult workers who became unemployed and who participate in such
programs. Negative short run effects of these programs are attributed to a lock–in
effect while being in the program.
Recently, OECD (2005) has emphasized that long-term labor market programs,
such as training, often have little or negative short–run effects on outcomes. Also,
it is clear that lock–in effects are worse for longer programs, because they keep the
unemployed away from the labor market for a longer time. However, it could be the
case that sizeable labor market effects are only to be expected from sufficiently long
training programs (Fay, 1996). Therefore, it is crucial to assess program impacts in
a longer term perspective in order to investigate whether the sizeable lock–in effets
in the short run are compensated by positive long run effects. In fact, OECD (2005)
reports positive long term results for some training programs. This paper adds to
this literature by estimating the long–run employment effects of different types of
training programs in Germany over at least six years since the beginning of the
treatment.
The vast majority of the evaluation studies summarized in the aforementioned sur-
veys used a static evaluation approach receiving treatment during a certain period
of time against the alternative of not receiving treatment during this period of time.
In a dynamic setting, the timing of events becomes important, see Abbring and van
den Berg (2003, 2004), Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004), and Sianesi (2003,
2004). Static treatment evaluations run the risk of conditioning on future outcomes
leading to possibly biased treatment effects. This is because the nontreated indi-
viduals in the data might be observed as nontreated because their treatment starts
after the end of the observation period or because they exit unemployment before
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treatment starts (Fredriksson and Johansson 2003, 2004). This paper follows Sianesi
(2003, 2004) and estimates the effects of treatment starting after some unemploy-
ment experience against the alternative of not starting treatment at this point of
time and waiting longer.
For Germany, appropriate data for a long term evaluation of public sector sponsored
training were not available for a long time and there existed serious scepticism in the
German policy debate as to whether ALMP is actually effective (Hagen and Steiner,
2000). Until recently, basically all the evaluation studies1 made use of survey data.2
Although these data are rich with respect to informative covariates, the evaluation
studies using survey data suffer from severe shortcomings with respect to the quality
of the treatment information and to the precision of the employment history before
and after treatment. The samples sizes in these studies are typically small. They
do not allow the researcher to evaluate the effects of any heterogeneous treatment
or of treatments targeted to specific groups of individuals.
Contributing to the debate on the effectiveness of ALMP, this paper analyzes the
employment effects of three types of public sector sponsored training programs in
West Germany. We use unique administrative data which have only recently become
available. Using data on employment, periods of transfer payments, and participa-
tion in training programs, we carefully identify three types of public sector sponsored
training programs for the unemployed. These programs are not associated with a
regular job. The largest program among the three is the Provision of Specific Profes-
sional Skills and Techniques (SPST). SPST programs provide additional skills and
specific professional knowledge in medium–term courses. The two other training
programs are working in a Practice Firm (PF) and Retraining (RT). RT involves
typically a two–year program providing complete vocational training in a new occu-
pation. PF involves training in a work environment simulating a real job. PF tends
to be a slightly shorter treatment than SPST. This classification of treatments is
developed in this paper and in the earlier paper, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005).
The three training programs considered here differ both in length and content (PF
1See Speckesser (2004, chapter 1) and Wunsch (2006, section 6.5) as recent surveys for Germany.
Previous studies based on survey data gave inconclusive evidence. For instance, for East Germany,
Lechner (2000) found negative employment effects of training programs in the short run and
insignificant effects in the long run based on survey data. In contrast, Fitzenberger and Prey
(2000) found some positive employment effects of training programs in East Germany.
2Notable exceptions are the recent studies of Lechner et al. (2005a,b) and Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2005), which are all based on the same data set as our study. In fact, the data set is
the outcome of a joint effort to merge administrative data for evaluation purposes, see Bender et
al. (2005). The studies of Lechner et al. (2005a,b) and our study differ substantially regarding the
exact treatment definition, the choice of valid observations, and the econometric methods used.
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has the strongest on–the–job component, SPST involves typically of–the–job class-
room training, RT involves both on–the–job and of–the–job training for a specific
occupation). Based on the aforementioned evidence reported by Martin and Grubb
(2001) and others, PF should be the most effective program, at least in the short
run. In contrast, Lechner et al. (2005a) report quite favorable evidence for RT.
This paper takes advantage of unique administrative data which integrate register
data on employment as well as data on unemployment and participation in active
labor market programs generated by the Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt
fu¨r Arbeit, BA). Our data set merges register data with benefit data and with sur-
vey data obtained from the local offices of the Federal Employment Office. This
survey records all cases of participation in further training programs during the pe-
riod 1980–1997 and offers rich information on heterogeneous courses. Our analysis
evaluates the effects of training for inflows into unemployment for the years 1986/87
and 1993/94 in West Germany. These two inflow samples face very different labor
market prospects due to changing business cycle conditions and the impact of Ger-
man unification for the second sample. It is of interest to investigate whether the
effects of ALMP differ by the state of the labor market due to business cycle effects.
The 1986/87 sample faced a fairly favorable labor market in the years to come cul-
minating in the unification boom in West Germany. In contrast, the 1993/94 sample
entered unemployment during one of the most severe recessions in West Germany
resulting in a prolonged period with bad labor market chances.
Since our analysis is based on administrative data, we have to use a non–
experimental evaluation approach. We build on the conditional independence
assumption purporting that for individuals with different treatment status the
employment outcome in case of not receiving the treatment of interest is the same
on average conditional on a set of covariates which cover socio–economic char-
acteristics, the previous employment history of the individuals, the beginning of
unemployment, and the elapsed duration of unemployment. The analysis uses the
popular propensity score matching approach adjusted to a dynamic setting building
on the recent work by Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) and Sianesi (2003,
2004). In fact, when the timing of treatment is a random variable, a static evaluation
approach is not appropriate for nonexperimental data. We evaluate the employment
effects of three multiple exclusive training programs both against the alternative
of nonparticipation and in pairwise comparisons building on Lechner (2001) and
Imbens (2000). Our matching estimator is implemented using local linear matching
(Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998) based on the estimated propensity
score. We run separate analyses conditional on elapsed duration of unemployment
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at the beginning of treatment. We distinguish between training programs starting
during quarters 1 to 2, 3 to 4, and 5 to 8 of unemployment.
Our analysis extends considerably upon the earlier work of Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2005) in several dimensions. The earlier paper evaluates the employment
effects of SPST against the comprehensive alternative of nonparticipation in SPST
for 36 months after the beginning of the treatment. The analysis is performed only
for the 1993 inflow sample into unemployment, both for East and West Germany.
This study analyzes the effects of three exclusive training programs for inflow sam-
ples in 1986/87 and 1993/94 in West Germany. The three programs are analyzed in
a multiple treatment framework and we evaluate medium– and long–run treatment
effects up to 25–31 quarters after the beginning of the treatment depending on the
start date of the treatment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short descrip-
tion of the institutional regulation and participation figures for Active Labor Market
Policy. Section 3 focuses on the different options of further training, their target
groups, and course contents. Section 4 describes the methodological approach to
estimate the treatment effects. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 concludes. The final appendix provides further information on the data and
detailed empirical results. An additional appendix, which is available upon request,
includes further details on the data and on the empirical results.
2 Basic Regulation of Further Training
2.1 Programs
For the period covered by our data, further training in Germany is regulated on
the basis of the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG) and is offered
and coordinated by the German Federal Employment Office (formerly Bundesanstalt
fu¨r Arbeit, BA). Originally, further training was conceived to improve occupational
flexibility and career advancement and to prevent skill shortages. In response to un-
employment becoming an increasingly persistent phenomenon during the 1980s and
1990s, further training changes its character from a rather preventive ALMP towards
an intervention policy predominantly targeted to unemployed, to those at severe risk
of becoming unemployed, and to problems groups in the labor market. With the in-
creasing number of unemployed entering training programs, skill–upgrading courses
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targeted to employed workers lose importance in favor of courses in which individ-
uals are taught new technologies or are given the opportunity to enhance existing
skills for the purpose of occupational reintegration.
The German legislation distinguishes three main types of training: further training,
retraining, and integration subsidy. In addition, there is short–term training which
only existed from 1979 to 1992. Although, during the 1980s and 1990s, there have
been many changes concerning passive labor market policy – i.e. changes in benefit
levels and eligibility criteria – the regulation of the traditional training schemes,
further training, retraining, and integration subsidy, remained stable until the end
of 1997 when the Labor Promotion Act was replaced by the Social Code III. In the
following, we give a short description of these programs:
• Further training (Weiterbildung) includes the assessment, maintenance and
extension of skills, including technical development and career advancement.
The duration of the courses depends on individual predispositions, other co–
financing institutions and adequate courses provided by the training suppliers.
• Retraining (Umschulung) enables vocational re–orientation if a completed
vocational training does not lead to adequate employment. Retraining is
supported for a period up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified
vocational education degree.
• As third program of further training, integration subsidy (Einarbeitungszu-
schuss) offers financial aid to employers who are willing to give employment
to unemployed or to workers directly threatened by unemployment. The sub-
sidy is paid for an adjustment period until the supported person reaches full
proficiency in their job (up to 50% of the standard wage in the respective
occupation).
• In 1979, short–term training was introduced under §41a AFG aiming at
“increasing prospects of integration”. With this program, skill assessment,
orientation and guidance should be offered to unemployed. The curricula
under this program are usually short–term, lasting from two weeks up to two
months and are intended to increase the placement rate of the unemployed.
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2.2 Financial Incentives for Participation
Except for the integration subsidy which is a subsidy to a standard salary (according
to union wage contracts), participants in training programs are granted an income
maintenance (IM, Unterhaltsgeld) if they satisfy the conditions of entitlement. To
qualify, they must meet a minimum work requirement of being previously employed
during at least one year in contributory employment or they must be entitled to
unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment assistance.3
Starting 1986 until 1993, the income maintenance amounted to 73% of the relevant
previous wage for participants with at least one dependent child and 65% otherwise.
This was higher than the standard unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeitslosengeld)
in this period which was at 68% and 63%, respectively. And IM was considerably
higher for those unemployed whose UB expired and who were receiving the lower,
means tested unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe) which amounted to
58% (with children) and 56% (without children).4 In 1994, income maintenance
and unemployment benefits were both cut back to a common level of 67% (with
children) and 60% (without children), taking away some of the financial incentives
to join a training measure. Unemployment assistance was also lowered to 57% (with
children) and 53% (without children).5
Receiving income maintenance while being in a training measure did not affect the
entitlement period for unemployment benefit payments. Effectively, this means that
the unemployed could defer the transition from unemployment benefits to unemploy-
ment assistance by taking part in a training measure. Additionally, while partic-
ipating in a training measure, participants in some circumstances could requalify
for unemployment benefits providing additional incentives for them to participate
in programs.6
Summing up, for our time period under investigation, there are positive financial
incentives for the unemployed to join a program. The income maintenance is at least
3If a person does not fulfil the requirement of previous employment, but had received unem-
ployment assistance until the start of the program, an income maintenance may be paid as well.
4In the relevant, period the exhaustion of UB and transition from the higher UB to the lower
UA took place between the 6th and the 32nd month of unemployment, depending on age and
employment history (for details see Plassmann, 2002).
5For detailed descriptions of the changes in regulations over time see Bender et al. (2005) and
Steffen (2005).
6This is because, until 1997, periods of income maintenance payments were counted on the
minimum work requirement for receiving unemployment benefits, for details see Bender and Klose
(2000).
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as high or higher than unemployment benefits and it is always higher than unem-
ployment assistance. Furthermore, participation allows to postpone the transition
from unemployment benefits to the lower, means tested unemployment assistance
and sometimes even allows to requalify for unemployment benefits. In addition,
the BA bears all costs directly incurred through participation in a further training
scheme, especially course fees.
2.3 Participation
Among the three main types of training programs distinguished by German legis-
lation, the general further training scheme (Berufliche Weiterbildung) traditionally
is the most important in West Germany, which can be seen from table 1. Starting
with a total of 232,500 participants in 1980, 70% of all participants start a further
training scheme, whereas only 14% (32,600) begin a program under the integration
subsidy (Eingliederungszuschuss) scheme. New entrants into retraining (Berufliche
Umschulung) sum up to 37,900, about 16% of the total. On average, the stock of
participants is about 89,300 in 1980. In 1985, participant entries are 60% higher in
total. By then, further training programs amount to 80% of all participant entries.
Between 1980 and 1990, participation increases to 514,600, 74% of these are entries
into further training programs. Participation in retraining increases from 37,900 in
1980 to 63,300 in 1990. In 1992, shortly after the German reunification, partici-
pation peaks at 574,700 in West Germany, then declines to 378,400 in 1996. The
share of further training increases over time to 77%. The share of participants in
retraining amounts to 20%.
3 Data and Type of Treatment
This evaluation study uses a database that integrates administrative individual data
from three different sources. It contains spells on employment subject to social
insurance contributions, on transfer payments by the Federal Employment Office
during unemployment, and on participation in further training schemes. Relying
both on the transfer payment and on the participation data, we are able to identify
different types of training programs that are coherent within category. This is in
contrast to earlier studies that bundle very heterogeneous types of treatment and
which therefore provide much less informative evidence for policy makers.
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3.1 Employment and Benefit Data
The core data for this evaluation are taken from the IAB Employment Subsam-
ple (IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe, IABS) of the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB), see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender et al. (2005, chapter 2.1). The IABS is
a 1% random sample drawn from the mandatory employment register data for all
employees who are covered by the social security system over the period 1975–97.7
Social insurance contributions are compulsory for dependent employees with earn-
ings above a minimum wage that is free of social insurance contributions. Among
the dependent employees specific groups such as individuals working on a marginal
part–time basis and civil servants are excluded. Self-employed are also not con-
tained. Although these groups are not sampled, the IABS covers up to 80% of the
German labor force.
The second important source is the Benefit Payment Register (Leistungsemp-
fa¨ngerdatei, LED) of the Federal Employment Office (BA), see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.2).8 These data consist of spells on periods of transfer payments granted
to unemployed and program participants from the BA. Besides unemployment ben-
efit or assistance, these data also record very detailed information about income
maintenance payments related to the participation in further training schemes.
As already mentioned, the IABS is a random sample of all individuals who experience
at least one spell of dependent employment subject to social security contributions
between 1975–97. This sampling rule implies that one should restrict the analysis to
entrants into unemployment who were previously employed. As we do not observe
job seekers who do not draw some form of unemployment compensation, we are
unable to observe large parts of the potential control group for treated individuals
who did not experience employment subject to social insurance contributions before.
Altogether, the IABS samples roughly 1% of the overall dependent employment and
benefit receipt, resulting in 591,627 individuals and in 8,293,879 spells over the
7For the purposes of this study we obtained additional employment information from the IAB
covering the years 1998–2002.
8In the format that is available from the German central archive for empirical social research,
the IABS actually already contains information on transfer payments from the Federal Employ-
ment Office. However, these spells have been consolidated according to certain rules that do not
correspond to the requirements of this project. For instance, periods of receipt of transfer payments
from the BA are not reported if they lie parallel to employment records. However, participants in
training measures who work during an internship may well be recorded as employed in the IABS.
This implies a structural underreporting of treatment. Therefore, it has been necessary to merge
the transfer spells with the employment data a second time. Now transfer payments parallel to
employment spells are included.
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period 1975–97 for both East and West Germany.
3.2 Monitoring Data for Training and the Merged Data Set
The training participation data (FuU–data) are collected for all participants in fur-
ther training, retraining, integration subsidies and language courses in Germany for
internal monitoring and statistical purposes, see Bender et al. (2005, chapter 2.3)
for a description of the FuU–data. Aggregate statistics based on these data were
published regularly by the BA. These data report information about the type of
course, the intended integration objectives and – with less detail – about the con-
tents of the courses with respect to the skills provided. In addition, they provide
information about personal characteristics of the participants in training programs
(like sex, age, nationality, educational attainment, employment status before treat-
ment), the region in which the program takes place, the type of training (whether
the training takes place in classrooms or “on the job”), the providing institution
and the beginning and end dates. The data also indicate the type of income main-
tenance paid during participation. The sample size of the FuU–data amounts to
54,767 individuals corresponding to 72,983 treatment spells in the period 1980–97
(for West Germany, and 1991–97 for the new federal states). In principle, individuals
in the combined IABS–LED data receiving subsistence payments, that are related
to participation in a training program, should also be contained in the FuU–data.9
The FuU–data were merged with the combined IABS–LED data by social insur-
ance number and additional covariates, see Bender et al. (2005, chapters 3–4).
The merged data form the basis for an integrated evaluation database consisting
of comparable longitudinal information for treatment and control groups that cov-
ers all participants in further training, retraining, integration subsidies, short–term
training as well as language training.
In addition to merging the different files, numerous corrections have been imple-
mented in order to improve the quality of the data. Inconsistencies in both files,
which occurred with respect to the reported level of education and occupational sta-
tus, the year of birth and the family status, were removed. In particular, a correct
assessment of the level of education is important for the purpose of this study, be-
cause individual skills play an important role for the assignment into treatment. As
9However, there are some exceptions to this rule. In fact, we observe participants in the FuU–
data who do not receive income maintenance. Using the merged data is the only option to fully
identify treatments.
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the information on the individual’s education is recorded by the employer and mis-
reports do not have any consequences on social insurance entitlements, we assume
that this variable rather reflects the level of education necessary to fulfil the tasks in
the individual’s current job. The individual’s formal skill level may, however, very
well lie above the education level reported by the employer.10 A detailed description
of the correction procedure implemented in this study can be found in Bender et al.
(2005, chapter 3.4).
3.3 Contents and Types of Further Training
The legislation of further training provides only a very elementary framework for
the purpose of classifying different kinds of treatments. It does not define treatment
types with respect to specific integration targets or target groups. In fact, very
different kinds of treatments are administered under the same heading, e.g. training
for career advancement or short–term courses for long–term unemployed are both
reported as ‘further vocational training’. Earlier descriptive studies on the types
of treatment often do not distinguish treatments providing basic social skills from
treatments offering certified professional skills, which might have a very different
impact on job search.11
In contrast to earlier work, we are able to identify different types of further training
according to economically meaningful criteria with the merged database we are
using in this study. The combination of benefit and participation data allows us
to identify whether a treatment is provided outside a firm specific labor market or
within a firm, whether the course is general or occupation specific. Our paper is
one of the first studies on further training in Germany that exploits all available
information from administrative data, using the occupational status while being on
training, the specific information about benefit payments (which can be related to
specific types of interventions) and a variable recording the type of training in the
monitoring information on further training (FuU–data).12
10Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Vo¨lter (2006) analyze the quality of the education variable in
German employment register data and provide imputation methods for correcting it.
11An exception is the study by Blasche and Nagel (1995) that distinguishes whether the training
is carried out as adjustment or retraining and whether it is a full–time or part–time treatment.
12The training data should actually be sufficient to identify all participations in further training
since they should have been collected for all training spells started under the Labor Promotion
Act. However, there are two reasons which do not permit to rely only on the variable of type of
training from the FuU–data: First, these training data are sometimes incomplete because data
collection is not directly linked to benefit payments and reporting errors are therefore unlikely to
be detected. In such cases, one observes an income maintenance spell in the benefit data but no
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In order to identify informative (and coherent) types of treatment, we apply a ty-
pology that relies on the type of training given in the FuU–data and the closeness to
the demands of the labor market as indicated by the IABS–data on employment sta-
tus.13 In fact, employment status and program information are especially important.
While the program information ‘further vocational training’ might comprise both
employed and unemployed participants, the employment status allows additionally
to identify the target group (‘improving reintegration chances’ for unemployed or
‘career advancement’ for employees) or to indicate how close the program is related
to an internal labor market. A combination of training and employment data is
more informative than the unmodified information from the training data, because
the latter data do not specify details of the implementation and the target group of
a program.
Based on the information from both sources, a variety of different treatments can be
identified, which range from the provision of social skills and basic general training
over the provision of specific skills for the purpose of reintegration of the unemployed,
the integration of unemployed into firm specific labor markets, retraining and the
promotion of certified occupations up to career advancement training that is supplied
to persons without the risk of unemployment, see Speckesser (2004) for a more
detailed description.
3.4 Three Important Programs
In this study, we focus on three quantitatively important programs targeted at
the unemployed: practice firm (PF), provision of specific professional skills and
techniques (SPST), and retraining (RT). Whereas PF and SPST usually take six
to nine months, RT is very time intensive and usually lasts two years. The next
subsections will give more information about the contents of these programs.14 With
little change in their basic design, the three programs considered here have still
been in widespread use until recently, see the report by the Federal Commission for
training spell in the FuU–data. Thus, it is necessary to also consider the information in the benefit
data to identify the full extent of participation in a program. Second – and equally important –
the use of employment data and benefit data increases the precision of information on the type of
training. It allows to find out whether a person was employed while being participant or whether
a specific benefit was paid, both offering additional valuable information about the participant’s
type of treatment.
13This typology has been developed by Speckesser (2004, chapter 3).
14A description of the other types of training as e.g. courses targeted at other groups like career
advancement subsidies for the employed and wage subsidies for people who recently found a job
can be found in the additional appendix.
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Education Planning and Research BLK (2000).
3.4.1 Practice Firm
Practice firms are simulated firms in which participants practice everyday working
activities. The areas of practice are whole fields of profession, not specific professions.
Hence, practice firms mainly train general skills while provision of new professional
skills is of less importance. Some of practice firms are technically oriented, the
practice studios, whereas others are commercially oriented, the practice enterprises.
One of the practice firm’s goals is to evaluate the participant’s aptitude for a field
of profession. The programs usually last for six months and do not provide official
certificates.
3.4.2 Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques
Provision of specific professional skills and techniques intends to improve the start-
ing position for finding a new job by providing additional skills and specific pro-
fessional knowledge in medium–term courses. It involves refreshing specific skills,
e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. SPST is targeted at
unemployed or persons at risk of becoming unemployed in order to facilitate inte-
gration into full employment. This program mainly consists of classroom training
but an acquisition of professional knowledge through practical working experience
may also be provided.
After successfully completing the course, participants usually obtain a certificate
indicating the contents of the course, i.e. the refreshed or newly acquired skills and
the amount of theory and practical work–experience. Such a certificate is supposed
to serve as an additional signal to potential employers and to increase the matching
probability since the provision of up to date skills and techniques is considered to be
a strong signal in the search process. The provision of specific professional skills and
techniques aims at achieving the sustained reintegration of unemployed or workers at
risk of unemployment into the labor market by improving skills as well as providing
signals. Compared to retraining, that is a far more formal and thorough training
on a range of professional skills and that provides a complete occupational degree,
the role of SPST for a participant’s occupational knowledge is weaker. However,
the amount of occupation specific knowledge imparted in SPST certainly exceeds
the level provided in short–term programs that usually aim at improving job search
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techniques or general social skills. Thus, SPST ranges in the middle between very
formal (and very expensive) courses on the one hand and very informal and general
courses on the other side. As can be seen from see table 2, SPST is quantitavely
the most important type of training for the unemployment cohorts analyzed here.
3.4.3 Retraining/Qualification via the Educational System
This type of training consists of the provision of a new and comprehensive voca-
tional training according to the regulation of the German dual system. It is offered
to individuals who already completed a first vocational training and face severe dif-
ficulties in finding a new employment within their profession. It might however also
be offered to individuals without a first formal training degree if they fulfil additional
eligibility criteria. Up to 1994, this type of treatment is also accessible to individuals
without the formal criterion of “necessity” for career advancement. Participants are
then granted income maintenance as a loan.
Qualification via the educational system/retraining provides widely accepted formal
certificates according to German dual system of vocational training. It comprises
both, theoretical training and practical work experience. The theoretical part of
the formation takes place in the public education system. The practical part is
often carried out in firms that provide work experience in a specific field to the
participants, but sometimes also in interplant training establishments. This type of
treatment leads to a formal job qualification that is supposed to improve the job
match.
3.4.4 Identification of the Three Programs in the Data
Participation in SPST and RT can be identified from either LED–data or FuU–
data, participation in PF only from FuU–data. In the best case, both sources
provide coherent information about participation and one can easily identify the
type of treatment from both data sources. However, due to quality deficiencies
in the participation data, many participants might not be recorded in the FuU–
data. In this case, the LED–data helps to identify the treatment on the basis of
the benefit variable which itself offers very detailed information about the type of
training. In other cases, we observe individual records showing employment in the
IABS and at the same time training in the FuU–data. This is for example the case
if the treatment takes place in a firm and individuals are paid a normal salary (e.g.
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integration subsidy) or if individuals are prepared for precise job offers. Since we
have two separate sources of data, we make use of all available information and
combine benefit information with participation data in order to identify all different
types of training.15
3.5 Inflow Sample into Unemployment and Participation by
Type of Training
The goal of this study is to analyze the effect of training programs on employment
chances of unemployed individuals. Therefore, we base our empirical analysis on
inflow samples into unemployment. We use the inflows into unemployment in the
years 1986/87 and 1993/94 in West Germany, omitting Berlin and East Germany.
Effectively, we consider individuals who experience a transition from employment to
nonemployment and for whom a spell with transfer payments from the Federal Em-
ployment Office starts within the first twelve months of nonemployment or for whom
the training data indicates a program participation before the unemployed individ-
ual finds a new job. In the following, we denote the start of the nonemployment spell
as the beginning of the unemployment spell. We condition on receipt of unemploy-
ment compensation or program participation to exclude most of the individuals who
move out of labor force after ending their job. This concerns especially individuals
whose treatment status would be nonparticipation in any training program during
their nonemployment spell. A treatment is associated with an unemployment spell
if the individual does not start employment before the second month of treatment.
Furthermore, we restrict our samples to the 25 to 55 years old in order to rule out
periods of formal education or vocational training as well as early retirement.
We choose the years 1993/94 and 1986/87 to make comparisons between the eighties
and the nineties. Figure 1 depicts the unemployment rate in West Germany. The
dotted vertical lines mark the years 1986 and 1993, respectively. Whereas in 1986/87,
we are at the end of a sequence of years with relatively high unemployment, the co-
hort 1993/94 enters during a period with increasing unemployment rates. Thus, the
1986/87 cohort faced a fairly favorable labor market in the years to come culmi-
nating in the unification boom in West Germany, while the 1993/94 cohort entered
unemployment during one of the most severe recessions in West Germany resulting
15The additional data appendix describes in details, which variables were used for this purpose
and how we identified the different program types giving a precise coding plan. Tables 2, 3 and
4 in the additional appendix show the shares by type of treatment that are identified from the
participation data, from the benefit payment data or from a combination of both.
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in a prolonged period with bad labor market chances. Our data allow to follow indi-
viduals entering unemployment in 1986/87 until December 1996/97 and individuals
entering unemployment in 1993/94 until the end of 2001/02. A second reason for
analyzing two different cohorts is that programs became more targeted over time,
see section 2.1.
Table 2 gives information about the size of the inflow samples and the incidence of
training. We focus on the three types of training programs which are most suitable
for unemployed individuals and which do not involve on–the–job training (training
while working in a regular job). These are (i) practice firm (PF), (ii) provision of
specific professional skills and techniques (SPST), and (iii) retraining (RT). The
total inflow sample comprises 20,902 spells for the 1986/87 cohort and 25,051 spells
for the 1993/94 cohort. There are 1,714 training spells for the eighties and 2,727
for the nineties. Thus, about 10% of all unemployed participate in one of the three
training programs considered. Among these, SPST represents the by far largest type
of training with 64% and 72% of the training spells, respectively in the two samples.
About one fifth of all training spells are RT, and PF represents the smallest group
in both samples. In absolute numbers, there are 246 (325) PF spells in the 86/87
(93/94) inflow sample, 1,093 (1,944) SPST spells and 375 (458) RT spells. Table 3
shows the frequency of training by time window of elapsed unemployment.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the elapsed duration of unemployment at
the beginning of treatment. Our discussion focuses on quantiles because averages
can be biased due to outliers. The median entrant in PF has been unemployed for
10 months in 1986/87 and 9 months 1993/94. Late starts (75%–quantile) of PF
occur after 19 months in 1986/87 and much earlier in the other sample. For RT,
the quantiles in the samples are very similar. With a median of 6 and 7 months, RT
starts the earliest in both samples. For SPST, we find a reversed trend in comparison
to PF. While SPST participation starts almost as early as RT in the 1986/87 sample,
the starting dates are noticeably later in 1993/94, with the median increasing from
6 to 11 months.
Table 5 provides descriptive information on the duration of training spells. The
average duration of practice firm is similar in both samples with 5.1 months in
1986/87 and 5.7 months in 1993/94. SPST has an average duration of 4.9 months
for the 1986/87 sample and 6.3 months for 1993/94. For Retraining, we have the
same picture as for SPST but at a higher level. This program lasts on average 13.1
months in the eighties and 14.9 months in the nineties.
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4 Evaluation Approach
We analyze the employment effects of K = 3 different types of public sector spon-
sored training programs, where we compare the different treatments among one an-
other as well as to nonparticipation in any of the programs. Our outcome variable is
the average difference in employment rates measured at a quarterly frequency. The
quarterly employment rate is obtained as the average of three monthly employment
dummy variables. We estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
i.e. the differential impact the treatment shows for those individuals who participate
in the treatment under consideration, in a context where individuals have multiple
treatment options. Extending the static multiple treatment approach to a dynamic
setting, we further distinguish three types of treatment depending upon the quarter
in which the program starts in terms of the elapsed unemployment duration. Our
dynamic evaluation approach following Sianesi (2003, 2004) applies the standard
static treatment approach recursively depending on the elapsed unemployment du-
ration. The estimated ATT parameter thus mirrors the decision problem of the
case worker and the unemployed who recurrently during the unemployment spell
decide whether to begin any of the programs now or to postpone participation to
the future.
In the following, we first discuss our extension of the static multiple treatment ap-
proach to a dynamic setting. Then, we describe the implementation of the matching
estimator for our problem.
4.1 Multiple Treatment Framework
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality,
see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999).
Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000) extend this framework to allow for multiple,
exclusive treatments. Lechner (2001) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) show how to
extend standard propensity score matching estimators for this purpose.
Let the K+1 potential outcomes be {Y 0, Y 1, ..., Y K}, where Y k, k = 1, ..., K, repre-
sents the outcome associated with treatment k and Y 0 is the outcome when receiving
none of the K treatments. To simplify the discussion, we will from now on refer to
the nontreatment outcome Y 0 as one of the K + 1 treatment outcomes. For each
individual, only one of the K + 1 potential outcomes is observed and the remaining
K outcomes are counterfactual.
16
One can define pairwise average treatment effects on the treated (ATT)
θ(k, l) = E(Y k − Y l|T = k) with k, l = 0, 1, ..., K and k 6= l,(1)
where T = 0, 1, ..., K represents the treatment received. The individual treatment
effect is the difference between the outcome Y k and the outcome Y l, where the latter
is not observed for the treated individuals in {T = k}. In the following, we call the
individuals with treatment status {T = k} the k–group and the individuals with
{T = l} the l–group. Note that in general θ(k, l) 6= θ(l, k) because the characteristics
of participants in treatment k differ from those for participants in treatment l.
4.1.1 Extension to Dynamic Setting
As already mentioned, we use the static multiple treatment framework in a dynamic
context. Our basic samples consist of individuals who start an unemployment spell
with transfer payments in 1986/87 or 1993/94 and who had been employed before.
These individuals can participate in any of the three training programs at different
points of time in their unemployment spell. Both the type of treatment and the
selectivity of the treated individuals depend upon the exact starting date of the
program. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2003,
2004) interpret the start of the program as an additional random variable in the
“timing of events”. Unemployed individuals are not observed to participate in a
program either because their participation takes place after the end of the observa-
tion period or because they leave the state of unemployment either by finding a job
or by moving out of labor force.
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) argue that it is incorrect to undertake a
static evaluation analysis by assigning unemployed individuals to a treatment group
and a nontreatment group based on the treatment information observed in the data.
Consider the case of analyzing treatment irrespective of the actual starting date
during the unemployment spell. If one assigns individuals to the control group who
find a job later during the observation period, one effectively conditions on future
outcomes when defining the treatment indicator. This might lead to a downward bias
in the estimated treatment effect, which is the bias emphasized by Fredriksson and
Johansson (2003, 2004). An upward bias can arise as well when future participants,
whose participation starts after the end of the observation period, are assigned to the
control group. Using duration analysis in discrete time, Fredriksson and Johansson
(2004) suggest a matching estimator for the treatment effect based on a time–varying
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treatment indicator. Treatment can only start at discrete points of time. In a similar
vein, Sianesi (2004) argues for Sweden that all unemployed individuals are potential
future participants in active labor market programs, a view which is particularly
plausible for countries with comprehensive systems of active labor market policies
like Sweden or Germany.
The above discussion implies that a purely static evaluation of the different training
programs is not warranted.16 Following Sianesi (2003, 2004), we extend the static
framework presented above in the following way.17 We analyze the employment ef-
fects of the first participation in a training program during the unemployment spell
considered conditional on the starting date of the treatment.18 We distinguish be-
tween treatment starting during quarters 1 to 2 of the unemployment spell (stratum
1), treatment starting during quarters 3 to 4 (stratum 2), and treatment starting
during quarters 5 to 8 (stratum 3). We do not analyze treatments starting later than
quarter 8. This allows us to study treatment effects for a long time period after the
beginning of the treatment. Moreover, for treatments starting after 8 quarters, it
seems increasingly difficult to distinguish unemployment from being out–of–labor
force. It is very likely that a number of individuals have left the labor force after
two years of unemployment. Our data do not allow us to distinguish the labor
market states unemployment and out–of–labor force, see the discussion in section 3.
4.1.2 Propensity Score Matching
We evaluate the differential effects of multiple treatments under the Conditional In-
dependence Assumption (CIA), i.e. we assume that conditional on individual char-
acteristics X the potential outcomes {Y 0, Y 1, ..., Y K} are independent of treatment
status T . Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing prop-
erty of the propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows
16In a static setting one has to deal, in addition, with the problem that the potential starting
dates of the nonparticipants are unobserved. Drawing random starting times of the program is
an alternative to use in this context, see e.g. Lechner (2000) and Lechner et al. (2005a,b) for this
approach. However, this does not overcome the problems discussed here and we prefer to consider
the timing of events explicitly. We do not introduce a random timing of the program starts among
the nonparticipants for the following three reasons. First, random starting dates add noise to the
data. Second, the drawn starting time might be impossible in the actual situation of the nontreated
individual. Third, drawing random starting dates does not take the timing of events seriously.
17We do not follow Abbring and van den Berg (2003) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2004) in
estimating hazard rate models because we are interested in the total employment effects irrespective
of multiple transitions between employment and nonemployment.
18We do not analyze multiple sequential treatments, see Bergemann et al. (2004), Lechner and
Miquel (2001), and Lechner (2004).
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that the conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives
treatment k or l, exhibits an analogous balancing property for the pairwise estima-
tion of the ATT’s θ(k, l) and θ(l, k). Formally, we have
E(Y l|T = k, P k|kl(X)) = E(Y l|T = l, P k|kl(X))(2)
and analogously
E(Y k|T = l, P k|kl(X)) = E(Y k|T = k, P k|kl(X)) .
P k|kl(X) is the conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual
receives treatment k or l, i.e.
P k|kl(X) =
P (T = k|X)
P (T = k|X) + P (T = l|X) ≡
P k(X)
P k(X) + P l(X)
.
Estimating θ(k, l) and θ(l, k) under the CIA, the balancing property in equation (2)
allows one to apply standard binary propensity score matching based on the sample
of individuals participating in either program k or l (Lechner, 2001; Gerfin and
Lechner, 2002; Sianesi, 2003). In this subsample of the data, one simply estimates
the probability of treatment k versus l, yielding an estimate of the conditional
probability P k|kl(X), and then applies standard matching techniques for the binary
case.
In order to account for the dynamic nature of the treatment assignment process, we
estimate the probability of treatment k versus l given that unemployment lasts long
enough to make an individual ‘eligible’. For treatment during quarters 1 to 2, we
take the total sample of unemployed, who participate in k or l during quarters 1 to
2, and estimate a Probit model for participation in k. If the comparison involves
nonparticipation in any treatment, then this group includes those unemployed who
either never participate in any program or who start treatment after quarter 2.
For treatment during quarters 3 to 4 or quarters 5 to 8, the basic sample consists
of those unemployed who are still unemployed in the first month of the stratum
considered. We then estimate a Probit of beginning a program within the considered
time interval of elapsed unemployment duration using all individuals who are still
unemployed at the beginning of the stratum and who participate in k or l during
the time interval. Sianesi (2004) estimates a separate Probit model for each of the
different starting dates of the programs. In our case, the number of observations is
too small for this. However, even if enough data were available, we think that it
would not be advisable to estimate Probit regressions by quarter (or even by month).
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The reason is that the starting date of the treatment is somewhat random (relative to
the elapsed duration of the unemployment spell) due to available programs starting
only at certain calendar dates. Therefore, we pool the treatment Probit for all
eligible persons in unemployment in three strata assuming that the exact starting
date is random within the time interval considered. However, when matching treated
and nontreated individuals, we align by elapsed unemployment duration at the start
of the program.
As already mentioned, we aggregate the relative starting dates into three strata
while the employment status is measured at a quarterly frequency. We therefore
implement a stratified matching approach in order to estimate the ATT for k relative
to l. Effectively, we impose as a matching requirement that the comparisons with
treatment l for an individual receiving treatment k are still unemployed in the
quarter before treatment k starts. This way, we only match participants in l who
might have started a treatment k in the same quarter as the respective participant in
k. In the following, we call this subset of the l–group the eligible l–group. Second,
within this group of eligible l–participants, we match individuals based on their
similarity in the calendar month of the beginning of the unemployment spell and
based on their similarity in the estimated propensity score by local linear matching.
The expression for the counterfactual outcome in treatment l for the treated k–
individual is then obtained through a local linear regression of the treatment outcome
in l on the estimated propensity score and the starting month of the unemployment
spell. For weighting, we use a bivariate product kernel (details will be described
below). This local linear regression is estimated in the eligible subset of the l–
group matched to the individual receiving treatment k. This way, we obtain a close
alignment in calendar time as well as elapsed unemployment duration, thus avoiding
drawing random starting times of the program.
4.1.3 Interpretation of Estimated Treatment Effect
Our estimated ATT parameter has to be interpreted in a dynamic context. We
analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until
the start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemploy-
ment spell considered. Therefore, the estimated treatment parameter is (similar to
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equation (1) in Sianesi, 2004)19
θ(k, l; u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(3)
−E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the treatment variable for treatment starting in quarter u of unem-
ployment. Y k(u, τ), Y l(u, τ) are the potential treatment outcomes for treatments
k and l, respectively, in periods u + τ , where treatment starts in period u and
τ = 0, 1, 2, ..., counts the quarters since the beginning of treatment. U is the dura-
tion of unemployment, u˜ is the random quarter when alternative treatment l starts,
and u¯ = 2, 4, 8 is the last quarter in the stratum of elapsed unemployment con-
sidered. Then, τ − (u˜ − u) counts the quarters since start of treatment l yielding
alignment of unemployment experience, because u + τ = u˜ + (τ − (u˜ − u)), and
Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜ − u)) is the outcome of individuals who receive treatment l between
period u and u¯.20 For starts of l later than u, we have u˜ − u > 0 and therefore,
before l starts, τ − (u˜ − u) < 0. Then, these individuals are still unemployed, i.e.
Y l(u˜, τ−(u˜−u)) = 0 when the second argument of Y l(., .) is negative. This way, we
account for the fact that alternative treatments, for which the individual receiving
treatment k in period u is eligible, might not start in the same quarter u. Also, each
member of the eligible subset of the l–group is used in the pairwise comparisons for
treatment k.
Conditioning on past treatment decisions and outcomes, the treatment parameter
for a later treatment period (quarters 3 to 4 or quarters 5 to 8) is not invariant
with respect to changes in the determinants of the exit rates from unemployment
or the treatment propensity in the earlier phase of the unemployment spell. This
is a direct consequence of modeling heterogeneity with respect to the starting time
of the treatment relative to the length of elapsed unemployment. Both the k–group
and the l–group at the start of the treatment are affected by the dynamic sorting
effects taking place before, see Abbring and van den Berg (2004) for a recent dis-
19In contrast to equation (3), Sianesi (2004) conditions on being unemployed in period u, i.e. U ≥
u. We use the restriction U ≥ u−1 defining eligibility for treatment assuming that the assignment
to treatment can occur up to one quarter before beginning of treatment. An unemployed in u−1
might anticipate obtaining a job in u. For this reason, our estimated treatment effect for treatment
versus receiving no treatment at all might be conservatively downward biased.
20Based on monthly data, Sianesi (2003) restricts the comparison to treatment l starting in the
same month as treatment k. In our setup, where starting times are aggregated into three strata,
that would leave eligible individuals for comparison with treatment k starting in period u not being
used in any pairwise treatment combination. That is because if u lies before the end of the time
window of elapsed unemployment considered, then some individuals in the eligible subset of the
l–group receive treatment after u.
21
cussion of this problem in the context of estimating duration models. Thus, the
estimated treatment parameter depends dynamically on treatment decisions and
outcomes in the past when taking the timing of events seriously (Abbring and van
den Berg, 2003; Fredriksson and Johansson 2003, 2004; Sianesi 2003, 2004). To
avoid this problem, one often assumes a constant treatment effect over the duration
of elapsed unemployment at the program start. Alternatively, other suitable uni-
formity or homogeneity assumptions for the treatment effect could be used. Such
assumptions are not attractive in our context.21 By taking account of the dynamic
sorting effects taking place before treatment, there is no simple relationship between
our estimated treatment parameter in equation (3) and the static ATT in equation
(1), the literature typically attempts to estimate.22
Using propensity score matching in a stratified manner, we estimate the treatment
parameter in (3) allowing for heterogeneity in the individual treatment effects and
for an interaction of the individual treatment effects with dynamic sorting taking
place. To make this a valid exercise, we assume the following dynamic version of the
conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA) to hold for our inflow sample
into unemployment
E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X)(4)
= E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu˜ = l, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X) ,
where X are time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) characteristics, Tu˜ = l
indicates treatment l between u and u¯, the end of the stratum of elapsed unemploy-
ment considered, and τ ≥ 0, see equation (3) above and the analogous discussion in
Sianesi (2004, p. 137). We effectively assume that conditional on X, conditional on
being unemployed until period u−1, and conditional on not receiving treatment k
or l before u (both referring to treatment in period u) individuals are comparable
in their outcome for treatment l occurring between u and u¯.
For l = 0, i.e. the comparison to the nontreatment alternative, the treatment pa-
rameter in (3) is interesting when each time period one decides whether to start
treatment in the next quarter against the alternative to postpone possible treat-
ment to the future (treatment now versus waiting, see Sianesi, 2004). For l 6= 0
21Sianesi (2003) reports ‘synthetic’ averages over the relative starting dates u,∑
u
Nk,u
Nk
θ(k, l;u, τ), to provide a summary statistic of the u specific treatments. These
estimated averages have by themselves no causal interpretation.
22Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) provide a more detailed discussion of the relationship
between the static and dynamic treatment parameter in the binary treatment case K = 1.
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and k 6= 0, the treatment parameter in (3) is interesting when each time period one
decides whether to start treatment k in the next quarter against the alternative to
receive treatment l at some point in the near future before the end of the considered
time window in elapsed unemployment (treatment k versus l in a dynamic context,
see Sianesi, 2003). In addition, exits from unemployment in a certain period are
not known in the period until they take place. Anticipation effects might invalidate
this analysis, when the actual job arrival or the actual treatment is known some
time beforehand. The former might introduce a downward bias in the estimated
treatment effect while the latter might introduce an upward bias. This is a problem
in any of the analyses based on the timing–of–events approach. However, it will not
be a problem, if individuals anticipate the chances or the determinants of one of
these events as long as this occurs in the same way for individuals receiving different
treatments or no treatment conditional on X and conditional on the duration of
elapsed unemployment u−1.
As a further balancing test, we investigate whether treated and matched nontreated
individuals should not differ significantly in their employment rates before the be-
ginning of treatment. By construction, treated individuals in the k-group and their
matched counterparts in the l–group exhibit the same unemployment duration un-
til the beginning of treatment k. Therefore, we investigate whether they differ in
time–invariant unobserved characteristics by analyzing employment differences dur-
ing eight quarters before the start of the unemployment spell.
4.2 Details of the matching approach
Estimating the ATT for treatment k versus l requires estimating the expected coun-
terfactual outcome for the individuals in group k, had they instead received treat-
ment l in the same or a later quarter during the time window of elapsed unem-
ployment considered. The estimation of the counterfactual outcome is based upon
the observed outcomes of the eligible individuals in the l–group. For this, we use
a matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman, Ichimura, Todd
(1998), Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999), Lechner (2000)) based on the estimated
dynamic propensity score, as described in the previous section, and apply local linear
matching to estimate the average counterfactual outcome.
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4.2.1 Local Linear Regression
Effectively, we run a nonparametric local linear kernel regression (Heckman, Ichi-
mura, Smith, Todd (1998), Pagan and Ullah (1999) Bergemann et al. (2004)) which
comprises a weight function wNl(i, j) that gives the higher weight to individual j in
the eligible subset of the l–group, {Tu˜ = l}, the stronger his similarity to participant
i in treatment k regarding the estimated propensity score and the starting month
of the unemployment spell. Based on a local linear regression of the outcomes in
the eligible l–group on the estimated propensity score and the starting month of
unemployment, the estimated ATT can be written as
1
Nk
∑
i∈{Tui=k}
 Y ki,ui,τ − ∑
j∈{Tu˜=l,ui≤u˜≤u¯}
wNl(i, j)Y
l
j,u˜,τ˜
 ,(5)
where ui is the quarter in which the treatment for i starts falling in the time window
considered. Nl is the number of eligible members of the l–group and Nk the number
of participants i in treatment k depending on elapsed unemployment u. Y ki,ui,τ and
Y lj,u˜,τ˜ = Y
l
j (u˜, τ − (u˜ − ui)) are the outcomes in the post treatment period ui + τ ,
where τ˜ = τ − (u˜− ui).
Kernel matching has a number of advantages compared to nearest neighbor match-
ing, which is widely used in the literature (Lechner 2000, Lechner et al. 2005a,b,
Sianesi 2003, 2004). The asymptotic properties of kernel based methods are straight-
forward to analyze and bootstrapping provides a consistent estimator of the sam-
pling variability of the estimator in (5) even if matching is based on closeness in
generated variables (this is the case with the popular method of propensity score
matching which will be discussed below), see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998),
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) or Ichimura and Linton (2001) for an
asymptotic analysis of kernel based treatment estimators.23 In contrast, Abadie and
Imbens (2006) show that matching estimators based on a fixed number of matches
are not root–N consistent and that the bootstrap is in general not valid due to their
extreme nonsmoothness.
23Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) discuss
the asymptotic distribution of estimated treatment effects based on local linear matching taking
account of the sampling variability of the estimated propensity score. This asymptotic result
justifies the application of bootstrapping.
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4.2.2 Kernel Function and Bandwidth Choice
Matching estimators differ with respect to the weights attached to members of the
comparison group. In our case, the weights are implied by the nonparametric local
linear kernel regression of the outcome in the eligible l–group, Y lj,u˜,τ˜ , on the estimated
propensity score and the starting month of unemployment, see Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1998). We use a product kernel (see Racine and Li (2004)) in the
estimated propensity score and the calendar month of entry into unemployment
KK(p, c) = K
(
p− pi
hp
)
· h|c−ci|c(6)
with K(z) = exp(−z2/2)/√2pi, i.e. the Gaussian kernel function.24 pi and ci are the
estimated propensity score and the calendar month of entry into unemployment,
respectively, for treated individual i in the k–group, p and c for eligible individ-
uals in the l–group. hp and hc are the bandwidths which are determined by the
crossvalidation procedure described in the following.
In our case, standard bandwidth choices for pointwise estimation are not advisable
because the estimation of the treatment effect is based on the average expected
outcome in treatment l for the treated individuals in the k–group. To choose the
bandwidths hp and hc, we use a two dimensional variant of the leave–one–out cross–
validation procedure suggested in Bergemann et al. (2004) and Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2005) mimicking the estimation of the average expected outcome in the
alternative treatment l for each period. First, for each participant i in the k–group,
we identify the nearest neighbor nn(i) in the eligible subset of the l–group, i.e. the
individual in that group whose propensity score is closest to that of i. Second, we
choose the bandwidths to minimize the sum of the period–wise squared prediction
errors
τmax∑
τ=0
 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Y lnn(i),ui,τ − ∑
j∈{Tu˜(i)=l,ui≤u˜≤u¯}\nn(i)
w(Nl(i)−1)(i, j)Y
l
j,u˜,τ˜
2(7)
where τmax = 33− u and u = 1, 3, 5 is the first quarter of the time window 1–2, 3–4,
5–8 during which treatment starts. τ counts the number of quarters since quarter ui,
andNl(i) represents the size of the eligible l–group for i, {Tu˜i = l}. The estimation of
the employment status for nn(i) is not based on nn(i) itself. However, the individual
24Note that hc ∈ [0, 1], where hc = 0 amounts to only considering matches whose unemployment
spell starts in the same calendar month.
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nn(i) is used for the local linear regression for other treated individuals in the k–
group, provided it is in the eligible l–group and unless it happens to be also the
nearest neighbor in this case. Therefore, the local linear regression in (7) always
depends on (Nl(i) − 1) observations. The optimal bandwidths hp and hc affecting
the weights w(Nl(i)−1)(i, j) through the local linear regression are determined by a
two–dimensional search.25
4.2.3 Bootstrapping
We take account of the sampling variability in the estimated propensity score by
bootstrapping the standard errors of the estimated treatment effects. We use partly
a parametric bootstrap by resampling the coefficients of the probit estimates for the
propensity scores based on their estimated asymptotic distribution. To account for
autocorrelation over time, we use the entire time path for each individual as block
resampling unit. All the bootstrap results reported in this paper are based on 200
resamples. Since the crossvalidation in (7) is computationally expensive, the sample
bandwidths are used in all resamples.
4.2.4 Balancing Test
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to
investigate whether the time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) covariates
are balanced sufficiently by matching on the estimated propensity score Pˆ (X). The
test involves regressing the respective covariate Xg on a flexible polynomial in Pˆ (X)
with order δ and interactions with the treatment dummy variable
Xg =
δ∑
d=0
βd Pˆ (X)
d +
δ∑
d=0
γdDk Pˆ (X)
d + ηkl ,(8)
where Xg is one component in the covariate vector X and Dk = I(T = k) is a
dummy variable for treatment k. The regression in (8) is estimated separately based
on the sample of those individuals receiving either treatment k or l in the respective
interval for unemployment duration (1–2, 3–4, 5–8). If the estimated propensity
score balances the covariate Xg in the treatment and the control sample, then the
coefficients on all terms involving the treatment dummy, γ0, γ1, ..., γδ, should be
25Since the controls consist of the large group of nonparticipants in the respective stratum, it
turns out for our application that there is no need to smooth over the calendar month of entry into
unemployment as well. In this case, hc is set to zero and a one dimensional search is performed.
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zero. We test this joint hypothesis both for cubic (δ = 3) and quartic (δ = 4)
polynomials to see whether the test result is sensitive to the choice of the order of
the polynomial, a problem mentioned by Smith and Todd (2005, p. 373). If the
test does not reject, then the treatment dummy Dk does not provide any significant
information about the covariate Xg conditional on the estimated propensity score.
For each specification of the propensity score, we report the number of covariates
for which the balancing test passes, i.e. the zero hypothesis is not rejected.26
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores
Our empirical analysis is performed separately for the two samples of inflows from
employment into unemployment, associated with transfer payment or program par-
ticipation. To estimate the propensity scores, we run Probit regressions for training
starting during the three time intervals for elapsed unemployment duration, i.e. 1–2
quarters (stratum 1), 3–4 quarters (stratum 2), and 5–8 quarters (stratum 3). In-
stead of estimating a multinomial choice model for entry in one of the three programs
or no entry at all for each window of elapsed unemployment duration and sample
we estimate a series of binary Probit regressions. In the additional appendix, we
report our preferred specifications for the 1986/87 and 1993/94 samples which are
obtained after extensive specification search.
The covariates considered are all defined for the beginning of unemployment and are
thus time–invariant for an individual during the unemployment spell. Personal char-
acteristics considered are age (as dummies for five–year intervals), dummy variables
for gender, marital status, having kids, being a foreigner and formal education (no
vocational training degree, vocational training degree, tertiary education degree).
In addition, we use information about the last employer, namely industrial sector
and firm size dummies, and a number of characteristics of the previous job as em-
ployment status and information on earnings in the previous job. Furthermore, we
use three variables containing information on earnings. Due to reporting errors and
censoring, we do not know the exact earnings for all observations. Therefore, we
distinguish the following three cases. First, we use a dummy variable that is equal
to one if daily earnings are above 15 Euro (in 1995 Euros), roughly the minimum
26The results of the propensity score estimations are contained in the additional appendix.
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level to be subject to social security taxation.27 Second, we have a dummy variable
that indicates whether daily earnings are topcoded at the social security taxation
threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). Third, we have a variable that records log
daily earnings in the range between 15 Euro and the topcoding threshold and zero
otherwise.
Regarding the employment and program participation history, we consider the fol-
lowing covariates. We use dummies indicating employment status in month 6, 12,
and 24 before the beginning of unemployment. We also consider the number of
months in regular employment during five years before the beginning of unemploy-
ment. The previous program participation history of an individual is captured by
dummy variables that indicate participation in an ALMP program in year(s) 1, 2,
and 3–5 before the beginning of unemployment. Differences in regional labor market
conditions as well as supply of programs are the reason to include regional variables
in the specification. We use the federal state of last employment and the unemploy-
ment rate as well as the population density at the district level. Finally, we also
use the calendar month of the beginning of the unemployment period, either as a
variable counting elapsed months since a given reference date (e.g. January 1960)
or as dummies for the respective years and quarters.
Our specification search starts by using as many as possible of the covariates men-
tioned above without interactions. The specification search is mainly led by the
following two criteria: (i) single and joint significance, and (ii) balance of the co-
variates according to the Smith–Todd (2005) test implemented as described in the
last section. As regards the qualitative variables, like state, firm size and industry,
which are split up into dummies for the different categories in the regression, we
usually test for joint significance. When insignificance is found, the covariates are
dropped. Furthermore, we test for the significance of interaction effects, in particu-
lar interactions with gender and age. In order to achieve balance of covariates, we
test different functional forms (e.g. the square of a variable) and interaction effects.
In a few cases, we keep insignificant covariates or interactions if they help to achieve
balance. As we find the balancing test to be somewhat sensitive to small cell sizes
we occasionally aggregate small groups that have similar coefficients. One example
27Monthly earnings below e.g. DEM 410 in 1986 and DEM 500 in 1992 in West Germany for
marginal part–time employees (geringfu¨gig Bescha¨ftigte) were not subject to social security taxation
and should therefore not be present in the data. In addition, it was possible to earn at most twice
as much in at most two months of the year without contributing to the social insurance. Probably
due to recording errors, the data shows a number of employment reports with zero or very low
earnings. Since this information is not reliable, we only use the information for daily earnings
reported above 15 Euro as a conservative cut–off point.
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is the aggregation of two federal states.
The results for the Probit estimates in the additional appendix show that the final
specifications vary considerably over the inflow cohorts and the three time intervals
even keeping the k/l–comparison constant. On the one hand, this emphasizes the
necessity to treat all 36 k/l–pairs separately. On the other hand, it makes it impos-
sible to present and discuss all the specifications in detail. In general, the number
of covariates decreases with elapsed unemployment duration. This is not surprising
because many covariates contain information about the previous job, which should
characterize someone in a better way who has only recently become unemployed
compared to a long–term unemployed.
Age effects are significant in most estimations. In particular, participants in retrain-
ing are younger than individuals in other groups. This reflects the assignment policy
of the employment agency. In fact, the very comprehensive and expensive retrain-
ing schemes are preferably assigned to individuals who have a long time horizon of
working life. Gender effects are also relevant in most estimations, but cannot be
easily summarized. In cases where the foreign dummy is significant, it shows that
foreigners have a lower probability to participate in any program. The employment
history is important in most estimations. Previous participation in an ALMP pro-
gram is sometimes significant. If so, it increases the probability of another program
participation. The industrial sector of the previous job is sometimes significant and
the firm size only rarely. In most estimations regional effects and the calendar date
of unemployment entry (seasonal effects) are contained.
The results of the balancing tests for each specification are also reported in the ad-
ditional appendix. Using a cubic in the estimated propensity score the test almost
always does not reject for all or for all except one variable in the respective propen-
sity score specification. Only in two out of 36 cases the test rejects two variables.
Considering both variants, i.e. the cubic and the quartic in the propensity score, the
test does not reject for more than one variable in the specification in 20 out of 36
specifications. Overall, we are confident to have achieved a sufficient degree of bal-
ance between treatment and control groups in order for matching on the propensity
score to be a valid exercise.
A graphical examination of the common support requirement for estimating the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can also be found in the additional
appendix. When the control group consists of those not participating in any pro-
gram, for very small estimated participation probabilities, there is sometimes only
a positive density for the nonparticipants. This does not matter since we only es-
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timate the ATT for the participants but not the ATT for the nonparticipants (i.e.
treatment on the untreated) in this case. Moreover, as we perform kernel match-
ing we need not be concerned about closeness of treated individuals and potential
matches because the kernel weights account for this. Overall, we are satisfied with
the overlap of support for all k/l-pairs and proceed without restricting the samples.
5.2 Estimated Treatment Effects
The outcome variable is the average of monthly employment dummies in a quar-
ter. We match participants in treatment k and participants in treatment l by their
similarity in the estimated propensity scores28 and the starting month of the un-
employment spell. For matching, we use only eligible participants in l who are
still unemployed in the quarter before treatment starts and we align them by the
quarter of elapsed unemployment duration. The ATT is then estimated separately
for quarters τ = 0, ..., τmax since the beginning of program k according to equation
(5), where τmax = 31, 27, 25, respectively, for stratum 1, 2, and 3. The expected
counterfactual employment outcome for l is obtained by means of a local linear re-
gression on the propensity score and the starting month of the unemployment spell
among the eligible l–group. We obtain an estimate for the variance of the estimated
treatment effects through bootstrapping the entire observation vector for a spell in
our inflow sample. This way, we take account of possible autocorrelation in the
outcome variable. Inference is based on 200 resamples. As a further test of the
matching qualitiy, we estimate in the same way the differences between participants
and matched nonparticipants during quarters 1 to 8 before the beginning of unem-
ployment. By construction, participants in k and matched eligible members of the
l–group are unemployed between the beginning of their unemployment spell and the
beginning of the treatment in the k–group.
Figures 2–7 graphically represent the evaluation results. Each figure contains a panel
of three times three graphs, where each row represents one pairwise comparison of
two treatments and each column represents one of the three intervals of elapsed
duration of unemployment at the beginning of the treatment, i.e. 1–2 (stratum 1),
3–4 (stratum 2), or 5–8 (stratum 3) quarters since the start of the unemployment
spell. The graphs display the estimated average treatment effect for the treated
during quarters 0 to τmax since the beginning of the treatment and the differences
during 8 quarters before the beginning of the unemployment spell. We put pointwise
28We use the fitted index Xiβ from the Probit estimates.
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95%–confidence intervals around the estimated treatment effects. The vertical gap
at zero reflects the variable time between beginning of the unemployment spell and
the beginning of the treatment.
In order to contrast the initial negative lock–in effects of the programs with the
later positive program effects, we calculate the cumulated effects of the program 8,
16, and 24 quarters after the beginning of the program. The cumulated effects are
calculated as the sum of the effects depicted in figures 2–7 starting in quarter 0 and
summing up over the first 8, 16, and 24 quarters, respectively. Table 6 provides
the results. The estimated standard errors are based on the bootstrap covariance
estimates for the quarter specific treatment effects.
5.2.1 Training versus Waiting
We first discuss the effects of the three training programs against the alternative of
waiting, i.e. no treatment during the time interval (stratum) of elapsed unemploy-
ment duration, displayed in figures 2 and 5.
We do not find significant pre–unemployment employment differences in any case.
Since all individuals become eventually unemployed, this test for matching quality
should focus on the differences during the earlier quarters. There is no evidence of
systematic differences in employment rates between treated and associated matched
individuals. This indicates that time–invariant unobserved heterogeneity does not
invalidate our matching approach.
The results for 1986/87 in figure 2, show positive medium–run (1–3 years) and long–
run (4–6 years) post treatment effects of all three training programs after a negative
lock–in–effect in the program right after the beginning of treatment. These effects
are typically of the magnitude 10 to 20 percentage points (ppoints) and significant.
They are smaller and not significant for PF in the second and third stratum. For
SPST and RT the medium–run effects lie even above 20 ppoints for strata 2 and
3 and are larger than the long–run effects. As expected, the lock–in–periods are
shortest for PF (typically the shortest treatment), lasting at most 3 quarters, and
longest for RT, lasting up to two years. SPST lies in between for strata 1 and 2 with
a lock–in period of about 1 year and shows a very short lock–in–period of 2 quarters
for stratum 3. The positive effects for SPST show similar patterns for the three
strata (similar to the results for SPST in Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005), with
the effects being slightly higher in strata 2 and 3. For RT the positive medium–run
effects are larger for strata 2 and 3 compared to stratum 1 and the long–run effects
31
are larger for stratum 2 compared to both strata 1 and 2.
For the 1993/94 cohort, figure 5 shows similar patterns for training versus waiting.
For PF, we find shorter lock–in periods for strata 2 and 3 and small positive but
insignificant treatment effects after the lock–in period in stratum 1. For strata 2
and 3, we now find significantly positive medium– and long–run treatment effects of
10 to 15 ppoints. Again, the lock–in period is longer for SPST and even longer for
RT. The significantly positive medium– and long–run effects for SPST lie between
10 and 20 ppoints and are more persistent than for the earlier cohort. The positive
medium– and long–run effects for RT in stratum 1 are below 10 ppoints and barely
significant. The effects are somewhat stronger for strata 2 and 3.
Next, we discuss the cumulated effects of the different programs against the alterna-
tive of waiting, which are reported in table 6. This allows for a simple comparison of
the ATT effects across programs, though it is important to recall that these effects
for the treated cannot be compared because they are based on the separate groups of
participants in the different programs. It will be interesting to contrast these effects
to the results of the pairwise program comparisons reported in the next subsection.
For the 1986/87 cohort, the cumulated long–run effects after 24 quarters are signifi-
cantly positive at the 10%–level for all cases, except PF in stratum 3. Overall, SPST
shows the largest long–run effects with the highest value of 4.2 for stratum 3, i.e.
during the 24 quarters after the beginning of the treatment the treated individuals
are employed on average for about 4 quarters more than had they not been treated.
For SPST and RT, the long–run effects are higher for later strata, though one can
not put a causal interpretation to this because the selection of individuals in the
different strata changes. There are less cases with significantly positive cumulated
effects after 16 quarters. After 8 quarters, the cumulated effects are still negative
for RT due to the longer lock–in period, mostly positive for SPST and PF, and
significant in strata 2 and 3 for SPST.
For the 1993/94 cohort, the cumulated long–run effects after 24 quarters are signif-
icantly positive in all strata for SPST, for strata 2 and 3 for PF, and for stratum 2
for RT. For SPST, the pattern is similar to the earlier cohort. For PF, the effect is
higher for strata 2 and 3 and much lower for stratum 1. Also for RT, the effects are
lower and even significantly negative in stratum 1. Early treatments for PF or RT
in stratum 1 show worse effects for 1993/94 compared to 1986/87. The effects at 8
and 16 quarters for RT show stronger lock–in effects for the later cohort. For PF in
strata 2 and 3, there are stronger positive effects already at 8 and 16 quarters.
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Summing up, our results on training versus waiting show that most training pro-
grams yield significantly positive and fairly persistent medium– and long–run treat-
ment effects. There are strong lock–in effects, with RT showing the longest lock–in
periods (up to 8 quarters). The treatment effects for stratum 1 deteriorate from
1986/87 to 1993/94, which could reflect the stronger targeting in the later years.
The cumulated effects are significantly positive for most programs. Overall, SPST
seems to show the best results for the treated individuals.
5.2.2 Pairwise Comparisons of Training Programs
As mentioned before, the results in the previous subsection should not be misinter-
preted in saying that one program is better than another program because we only
reported estimated treatment effects for the treated individuals in one stratum and
the selection of treated individuals differs by stratum and program type. Therefore,
we now estimate the effects of a treatment k versus the alternative l, where l is one
of the other training programs, for the participants in treatment k. This pairwise
comparison addresses the issue whether the different programs are well targeted.
With individual heterogeneity of treatment effects, it could very well be the case
that the participants in SPST fare better on average through participating in SPST
as compared to RT even though the participants in RT also fare better on average
through participating in RT as compared to SPST. This example is used because
we find some evidence for such effects, though they are often not significant.
The quarterly treatment effects for the pairwise comparisons are displayed in figures
3, 4, 6 and 7. After a short description of these effects, our discussion focuses
on the cumulated effects in table 6. Note that for the pairwise comparisons, the
control groups used for local linear matching are considerably smaller compared to
evaluating one training program versus nonparticipation, see tables 2 and 3.
In the majority of cases, we do not find significant pre–unemployment employment
differences. In a small number of cases, there are significant (but barely so) em-
ployment differences for some quarters before the beginning of unemployment.29
Therefore, we conclude that there are no systematic differences in employment rates
left between treated and associated matched individuals.
We find significant short–run treatment effects in a number of cases reflecting the
different lock–in periods of the three training programs. RT performs worse than
29These differences in employment history become insignificant, if larger bandwidths are used.
Further details are available upon request.
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the two other programs during the first two years and PF tends to perform better
during the first year. However, we do not find this for all cases. We do not find
persistent medium– and long–run effects. In a number of cases, the treatment effects
in the medium and long run are significant over a short time period and display quite
erratic movements. We prefer to discuss the estimated cumulated effects to assess
these effects.
The estimated cumulated effects in table 6 suggest that for the cohort 1986/87 most
significant effects are caused by the differential lock–in periods. When comparing
SPST with RT for those treated in SPST, we find strong significant positive effects
after 8 quarters. When RT is compared with SPST for those treated in RT, we find
smaller such effects and the effect is insignificant for stratum 3. When comparing RT
with PF, we find analogous effects due to the longer lock–in period for RT but there
are only significant for PF versus RT in strata 1 and 3. The medium– and long–
run effects at 16 and 24 quarters are rarely significant. For participants in SPST,
SPST seems to outperform RT at 16 quarters for strata 1 and 3 but the cumulated
effects are reduced at 24 quarters and not significant any more. For participants in
RT, SPST seems to outperform RT as well at 16 quarters for stratum 1 but again
the effect at 24 quarters is reduced and not significant any more. PF seems to
outperform SPST for participants in SPST in stratum 1 after 24 quarters, whereas
the cumulated long–run effects are insignificant for participants in PF. The long–run
cumulated effects for RT in comparison to PF for participants in RT are positive and
sizeable, but not significant. The long–run cumulated effects of PF in comparison
to RT are also positive but not significant.
For the cohort 1993/94, the cumulated effects at 8 quarters are qualitatively similar
reflecting again the different lock–in periods. Both PF, for all strata, and SPST, for
stratum 1, seem to outperform RT in the medium– and long–run for the participants
in PF and SPST, respectively. RT is also outperformed in the medium– and long–
run by SPST and PF even for participants in RT, though the effects are only strongly
significant at 16 quarters (the effects are of similar size at 24 quarters). Comparing
SPST and PF, the medium– and long–run effects are not significant but the point
estimates suggest both programs outperform the respective other program for the
own participants.
Summing up, our results on the pairwise comparisons are much weaker compared
to the comparison of training versus waiting, because the standard errors for the
pairwise comparisons are much higher. Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions.
The significant cumulated effects after 8 quarters reflect the different lock–in periods
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for the three training programs. Most medium– and long–run cumulated effects are
insignificant which suggests that in these cases, the employment outcome of the
treated individuals could not have been improved on average in the medium– or
long–run by reallocating them to a different training program. There is, however,
weak evidence for SPST outperforming RT in the medium–run and in the long–run
even for the participants in RT, especially for the 1993/94 cohort. Also for the
1993/94 cohort, PF outperforms RT in the medium– and the long–run even for the
participants in RT. The point estimates for SPST versus PF suggest for stratum 1 in
1986/87 that the cumulated employment effect would have been better if participants
in SPST would have instead participated in PF. For 1993/94, the point estimates
suggest that SPST outperforms PF in the medium– and the long–run even for
participants in PF. However, none of these effects in 1993/94 are significant.
6 Conclusions
Based on a unique administrative data set, which has only recently been made avail-
able, we analyze the long–run employment effects of three types of public sector
sponsored training in West Germany, which do not involve a job for the partici-
pants. The three types of training are Pratice Firm (PF), Retraining (RT), and
the Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST). Specifically, we
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) against the alternative
of nonparticipation in any program as well as for pairwise comparisons among the
three programs. We take inflow samples into unemployment for West Germany
in 1986/87 and 1993/94. We use the approach for multiple treatment evaluation
suggested by Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000) and apply it to a dynamic setup.
Slightly modifying the approach suggested by Sianesi (2003, 2004), we distinguish
three types of treatment depending upon the elapsed duration of unemployment
when treatment starts, i.e. treatment starts during the first two quarters (stratum
1), during the third and fourth quarter (stratum 2), and in the fifth to eighth quar-
ter (stratum 3). An overall assessment of the microeconomic effects is not possible,
because necessary information for a comprehensive cost–benefit–analysis is lacking
in our data set.
When comparing treatment against nonparticipation, the estimated treatment ef-
fects in almost all cases involve first a lock–in period with negative treatment effects
and significantly positive treatment effects in the medium– and long–run. The lock–
in period is shortest for PF (at most 2 quarters) and longest for RT (around 2 years).
35
SPST lies in between with a lock–in period around of 4 to 6 quarters. The treat-
ment effects for stratum 1 deteriorate from 1986/87 to 1993/94, which might reflect
stronger targeting of the programs over time. The cumulated effects are significantly
positive for most programs. Overall, SPST seems to show the best results for the
treated individuals.
The pairwise comparisons of the three treatments, one against another, shows first
the differences in the lock–in periods and in most cases insignificant treatment effects
in the medium– and long–run. There is, however, weak evidence for SPST and
PF outperforming RT in the medium–run and in the long–run, especially for the
1993/94 cohort. For 1993/94, SPST tends to outperform PF, but the effect is not
significant. We do not find evidence for business cycle effects on the performance of
the programs.
Comparing our results to the study by Lechner et al. (2005a) based on the same
data source, our general results for the 1993/94 cohort differ only in some ways from
those obtained in their study, though the exact treatment definition, the choice of
valid observations, and the employed econometric methods differ substantially from
ours. In fact, we find significantly positive effects for all treatments relative to
nonparticipation much earlier after the treatment starts, but our results for RT in
comparison to other training programs are often negative.
Our study draws a somewhat more positive picture of large scale public sector spon-
sored training programs compared to the previous literature. However, an overall
assessment of the microeconomic effects is not possible since various necessary in-
formation for a comprehensive cost–benefit–analysis are lacking in our data. Since
the relative performance of SPST tends to improve over time and PF does not
seem to dominate the other two programs, our evidence is in contrast to some of
the conclusions in the surveys by Martin and Grubb (2001), Kluve and Schmidt
(2002), and OECD (2005) advocating a strong on–the–job component for public
sector sponsored training to show positive employment effects.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics and Description of Data
Table 1: Participation in Further Training in West Germany until 1997
Year Annual entries Annual average stocks
Total Further training Retraining Integration subsidy
1980 232.5 162.4 37.9 32.6 89.3
1985 371 298.2 45.1 27.7 114.9
1990 514.6 383.4 63.3 67.9 167.6
1991 540.6 421.2 70.5 48.9 189
1992 574.7 464.5 81.5 28.7 180.6
1993 348.1 266 72.2 9.9 176.8
1994 306.8 224.9 73.1 8.8 177.9
1995 401.6 309.7 81.8 10 193.3
1996 378.4 291.6 77.3 9.5 203.6
Remark: All numbers in thousands. Source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bunde-
sanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, several volumes
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Table 2: Participation in First Training Program for the Inflow Samples into Un-
employment
Training Program Frequency Percent of Percent among
inflow sample treated
Cohort 86/87
Practice Firm 246 1.2 14.4
SPST 1,093 5.2 63.8
Retraining 375 1.8 21.9
No training program above 19,188 91.8 –
Total inflow sample 20,902 100 100
Cohort 93/94
Practice Firm 325 1.3 11.9
SPST 1,944 7.8 71.3
Retraining 458 1.8 16.8
No training program above 22,324 89.1 –
Total inflow sample 25,051 100 100
Remark: Programs that start before a new job is found are considered. We exclude training
programs which start together with a job (like integration subsidies) or which involve a very
small number of participants since they are not targeted on inflows into unemployment (as
career advancement and German language courses). Furthermore, we do not consider the
very short programs according to §41a of the Labor Promotion Act, which are only offered
to the 1986/87 inflow sample as separate programs, but treat them as open unemployment.
This improves the comparability of the inflow samples since comparable very short–term
programs offered to the 1993/94 inflow sample are not recorded as programs but as open
unemployment in our data. Thus, a participation in retraining after a §41a program is
counted as the first program.
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Table 3: Number of Training Spells and Length of Unemployment before Program
Start
Cohort 86/87 Cohort 93/94
Practice Firm
1–2 quarters 74 102
3–4 quarters 60 102
5–8 quarters 69 86
>8 quarters 43 35
Total 246 325
SPST
1–2 quarters 503 528
3–4 quarters 257 481
5–8 quarters 176 669
>8 quarters 157 266
Total 1,093 1,944
Retraining
1–2 quarters 172 198
3–4 quarters 101 138
5–8 quarters 71 106
>8 quarters 31 16
Total 375 458
Remark: The time intervals indicate the quarter of program start relative to the beginning
of the unemployment spell.
Table 4: Elapsed Duration of Unemployment in Months at Beginning of Training
Spell
Cohort 86/87 Cohort 93/94
Practice Firm
Average 15.8 11.4
25%–Quantile 5 5
Median 10 9
75%–Quantile 19 15
SPST
Average 13.3 12.9
25%–Quantile 3 5
Median 6 11
75%–Quantile 14 18
Retraining
Average 10.2 8.1
25%–Quantile 3 3
Median 6 7
75%–Quantile 12 12
42
Table 5: Realized Duration of Training Spells in months
Cohort 86/87 Cohort 93/94
Practice Firm
Average 5.1 5.7
25%–Quantile 2 3
Median 5 6
75%–Quantile 6 8
SPST
Average 4.9 6.3
25%–Quantile 2 3
Median 4 6
75%–Quantile 7 8
Retraining
Average 13.1 14.9
25%–Quantile 5 6
Median 12 16
75%–Quantile 22 21
Remark: The duration of the training spell is defined as the number of months of continuous
training. No interruptions are allowed. If in any month we do not identify the program we
assume the program has ended the month before.
Estimated Employment Effects of Further Training Measures
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Figure 2: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 86/87, West Germany
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Figure 3: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 86/87, West Germany
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Figure 4: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 86/87, West Germany
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Figure 5: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 93/94, West Germany
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Figure 6: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 93/94, West Germany
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Figure 7: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Cohort 93/94, West Germany
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Difference in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-treatment (≥ 0) quarters on the abscissa.
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Table 6: Cumulated differences in employment rates – sum of quarterspecific average
treatment effects on the treated since beginning of treatment
Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -0.085 (0.385) 0.758 (0.706) 2.072 (1.016)∗∗
Stratum 2 0.164 (0.316) 1.150 (0.653)∗ 1.971 (1.009)∗
Stratum 3 0.276 (0.304) 0.748 (0.685) 1.280 (1.115)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 0.174 (0.118) 1.420 (0.241)∗∗∗ 2.524 (0.373)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.631 (0.173)∗∗∗ 1.920 (0.353)∗∗∗ 2.766 (0.536)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.702 (0.173)∗∗∗ 2.725 (0.406)∗∗∗ 4.221 (0.649)∗∗∗
Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -1.353 (0.169)∗∗∗ -0.150 (0.326) 0.921 (0.511)∗
Stratum 2 -0.678 (0.252)∗∗∗ 1.069 (0.501)∗∗ 2.842 (0.761)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.347 (0.216) 1.673 (0.533)∗∗∗ 3.017 (0.808)∗∗∗
Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs SPST, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 0.028 (0.355) -0.199 (0.686) 0.023 (1.036)
Stratum 2 -0.159 (0.426) -0.014 (0.833) 0.431 (1.224)
Stratum 3 0.635 (0.348)∗ 0.435 (0.876) 0.722 (1.499)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs RT, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 0.853 (0.395)∗∗ 0.348 (0.736) 0.259 (1.117)
Stratum 2 0.485 (0.526) 0.887 (1.165) 1.072 (1.868)
Stratum 3 1.237 (0.350)∗∗∗ 0.907 (0.836) 0.140 (1.402)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs PF, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -0.125 (0.339) -0.848 (0.714) -2.114 (1.041)∗∗
Stratum 2 0.442 (0.606) 0.039 (1.148) -0.810 (1.556)
Stratum 3 0.798 (0.406)∗∗ 1.837 (1.022)∗ 1.768 (1.601)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs RT, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 1.246 (0.354)∗∗∗ 1.072 (0.599)∗ 0.199 (0.789)
Stratum 2 1.208 (0.372)∗∗∗ 0.842 (0.708) 0.126 (1.062)
Stratum 3 1.310 (0.286)∗∗∗ 1.625 (0.771)∗∗ 1.575 (1.240)
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Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs PF, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -0.590 (0.476) 0.957 (1.064) 2.413 (1.728)
Stratum 2 -0.496 (0.498) 0.413 (1.022) 1.252 (1.528)
Stratum 3 -0.133 (0.431) 1.498 (1.104) 1.632 (1.654)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs SPST, Cohort 86/87, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -1.173 (0.227)∗∗∗ -1.024 (0.440)∗∗ -0.774 (0.698)
Stratum 2 -0.674 (0.376)∗ 0.354 (0.848) 1.778 (1.345)
Stratum 3 -0.430 (0.269) -0.207 (0.691) -0.066 (1.098)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -0.001 (0.293) 0.317 (0.606) 0.876 (0.924)
Stratum 2 0.340 (0.235) 1.566 (0.499)∗∗∗ 2.862 (0.744)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.544 (0.276)∗∗ 1.590 (0.600)∗∗∗ 2.540 (0.899)∗∗∗
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -0.012 (0.113) 1.201 (0.235)∗∗∗ 2.375 (0.348)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.378 (0.130)∗∗∗ 1.745 (0.266)∗∗∗ 3.070 (0.421)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.439 (0.097)∗∗∗ 1.495 (0.217)∗∗∗ 2.544 (0.338)∗∗∗
Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -1.982 (0.149)∗∗∗ -1.552 (0.340)∗∗∗ -1.061 (0.535)∗∗
Stratum 2 -1.218 (0.192)∗∗∗ -0.059 (0.395) 1.352 (0.649)∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.845 (0.257)∗∗∗ -0.074 (0.556) 1.310 (0.905)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs SPST, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 0.209 (0.282) -0.498 (0.605) -1.054 (0.930)
Stratum 2 -0.085 (0.354) -0.324 (0.741) -0.300 (1.136)
Stratum 3 0.333 (0.376) 0.485 (0.782) 0.439 (1.165)
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Cumulated Treatment Effects, PF vs RT, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 2.002 (0.376)∗∗∗ 1.723 (0.763)∗∗ 1.534 (1.234)
Stratum 2 1.500 (0.387)∗∗∗ 2.623 (0.795)∗∗∗ 3.322 (1.296)∗∗
Stratum 3 1.463 (0.355)∗∗∗ 2.559 (0.879)∗∗∗ 2.893 (1.408)∗∗
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs PF, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 0.174 (0.391) 0.920 (0.824) 1.017 (1.240)
Stratum 2 0.210 (0.366) 0.620 (0.828) 1.306 (1.374)
Stratum 3 0.081 (0.370) 0.733 (0.898) 1.852 (1.378)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, SPST vs RT, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 1.926 (0.263)∗∗∗ 2.065 (0.614)∗∗∗ 1.984 (0.981)∗∗
Stratum 2 0.801 (0.311)∗∗ 0.958 (0.616) 0.963 (0.950)
Stratum 3 0.929 (0.215)∗∗∗ 0.886 (0.560) 0.420 (0.860)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs PF, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -1.707 (0.374)∗∗∗ -1.477 (0.805)∗ -1.481 (1.164)
Stratum 2 -1.890 (0.445)∗∗∗ -2.453 (1.017)∗∗ -2.158 (1.678)
Stratum 3 -2.112 (0.743)∗∗∗ -2.988 (1.713)∗ -3.341 (2.694)
Cumulated Treatment Effects, RT vs SPST, Cohort 93/94, West Germany
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 -1.485 (0.257)∗∗∗ -1.698 (0.540)∗∗∗ -1.453 (0.848)∗
Stratum 2 -1.411 (0.250)∗∗∗ -1.661 (0.536)∗∗∗ -1.389 (0.869)
Stratum 3 -0.940 (0.201)∗∗∗ -1.372 (0.519)∗∗∗ -1.122 (0.825)
Remark: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%–, 5%–, and 1%–significance
level, respectively.
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